Revolut Data Breach: How Fake Government Requests Worked

Attackers used a stolen Italian government mailbox to request Revolut customer data, and the bank complied for months. What happened, why the request channel is an access path, and five steps to verify requests before release.

Last updated: September 24, 2026. Reviewed by the RED SKY Consulting editorial team.

The Revolut data breach confirmed on September 12, 2026 exposed passports, verification selfies, and full transaction histories without anyone breaking into Revolut's systems. Attackers used a genuine Italian government email account to send fraudulent requests for customer information, and Revolut's European bank answered them as legal obligations over several months.

The lesson for every bank, fintech, and platform that handles government data requests is that the request channel is an access path, and it needs the same verification as a privileged login. Security researchers at Hudson Rock found roughly 300 stolen logins for the Italian Interior Ministry's certified mail domain in infostealer logs, so a trusted sender address proves very little on its own.

Key takeaways

  • Revolut confirmed on September 12, 2026 that an unauthorized third party used a legitimate government agency email domain to submit fraudulent requests for customer data.
  • Reporting based on the attackers' own claims puts the number of targeted customers at about 680, chosen as likely cryptocurrency holders, with a $3 million ransom demand posted publicly on September 16.
  • The FBI warned in November 2024 that criminals were using compromised US and foreign government email accounts to send fraudulent emergency data requests to companies.
  • Verizon's 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report found that 54% of ransomware victims had their domains appear in infostealer credential dumps.
  • RED SKY Consulting's 8,500-plus CISO advisory network supports fractional security leadership for firms where data-request intake sits outside the security team.

How the Revolut data breach worked

The Revolut data breach worked by turning a lawful disclosure process into a data theft channel. According to TechCrunch's September 12 report on Revolut's confirmation, the company described a "sophisticated external impersonation scam" in which a third party used a legitimate government agency domain email to request information, and said its systems and customer funds were unaffected.

A fraudulent data request is a demand for customer records that appears to come from police, a court, or a regulator but is sent by a criminal using stolen or spoofed credentials. Financial institutions are legally required to respond to genuine requests, which is what makes the forged version effective.

Date (2026)EventSource
Several months before SeptemberFraudulent requests sent from an Italian PEC government mailboxIrish Times, American Banker
Sept. 12Revolut confirms the impersonation scamTechCrunch
Sept. 14Exposed data types detailedSecurityWeek
Sept. 15Hudson Rock finds about 300 stolen pec.interno.it loginsInfoStealers
Sept. 16Attacker posts a $3 million ransom demandSecurityWeek

The attackers used Italy's certified government email system

PEC, or Posta Elettronica Certificata, is Italy's state-regulated certified email service, whose messages carry legal weight similar to registered mail. Security Affairs reported on September 16 that the abused mailbox was associated with the Prefecture of Reggio Calabria on the Interior Ministry's pec.interno.it domain, and that the requests impersonated officers of Italy's Postal Police.

Because the messages came from a real government mailbox, they passed the technical authentication checks a compliance team would normally rely on, American Banker reported on September 18. The requests went to Revolut Bank UAB, the company's Lithuania-based subsidiary.

What customer data was exposed

According to SecurityWeek's September 14 breakdown of the exposed data, the disclosures included names, addresses, dates of birth, occupations, passport and driver's license copies, verification selfies, IBANs, account statements, and complete transaction histories, including cryptocurrency activity. That combination is enough to target a person physically as well as financially.

Revolut has not published a victim count. The attackers told the Financial Times they selected about 680 customers through blockchain analysis, mostly in Switzerland and France, as reported by the Irish Times on September 16. A day later, SecurityWeek covered the $3 million ransom post and Revolut's statement that it had received no direct contact or demand.

Why fake government requests get past bank security

Fake government requests get past bank security because they arrive through a legal workflow that security teams rarely monitor. The sender is real, the urgency is plausible, and refusing a genuine request carries its own legal risk, so the incentive runs toward compliance.

Cybercriminals are likely gaining access to compromised US and foreign government email addresses and using them to conduct fraudulent emergency data requests to US based companies, exposing the personal information of customers to further use for criminal purposes.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Private Industry Notification on fraudulent emergency data requests (2024)

The FBI issued that warning on November 4, 2024, nearly two years before Revolut's disclosure. The supply of stolen government logins has not shrunk. The Hudson Rock analysis of the Revolut attackers' method concluded the attacker most likely bought existing infostealer logs rather than infecting Italian officials directly.

An infostealer is malware that copies saved passwords, session cookies, and browser data from an infected computer and sells them in bulk on criminal markets. The 2025 Verizon DBIR executive summary found that 46% of compromised systems holding corporate logins were unmanaged devices, and that third-party involvement in breaches doubled from 15% to 30%.

Ownership is the other gap. Denis Calderone, CTO of Suzu Labs, told American Banker that "at most banks, government data requests land with legal or compliance, not information security." When no security leader owns that intake process, nobody treats it as an attack surface.

How to verify a government data request before releasing customer data

Organizations can verify a government data request by confirming the requester through a channel the attacker does not control, checking the legal basis against the requesting authority's jurisdiction, and limiting what is released to the minimum the law requires. The FBI's 2024 notification recommends several of these steps directly.

What the request showsWhat to verify independently
A real government email domainCall the agency on a published number, never one in the email
An officer's name and badge numberConfirm the officer exists and holds that case
A cited statute or treatyCheck it matches the sender's jurisdiction
An urgent emergency claimRequire written follow-up within a set window
A request for full recordsRelease only the fields the legal basis requires
  1. Register every inbound government request in one system, with a named security owner as well as a legal owner.
  2. Call back the requesting authority through a verified directory before any release, including for certified email.
  3. Flag repeat requests from one sender, especially requests that target high-value customers, for security review.
  4. Monitor infostealer feeds for credentials tied to agencies that send you requests, and for your own staff.
  5. Rehearse a fraudulent-request scenario in the incident response plan, with legal, compliance, and security in the room.

Step one is a leadership decision more than a tooling one, and it needs an executive with authority over both legal intake and security. Fractional security leadership through CISO as a Service gives that process a named owner without waiting on a full-time hire.

What the Revolut breach means for regulators and incident reporting

A disclosure made to an impersonator is still a personal data breach under European law, whatever channel it arrived through. GDPR Article 33 requires notification to the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it. Revolut said it notified the relevant agency, law enforcement, data protection authorities, and financial regulators.

The cost of getting this wrong is measured in time as much as money. IBM's 2025 Cost of a Data Breach Report put the global average breach cost at $4.44 million, with a mean of 241 days to identify and contain. A request process mapped to NIST CSF 2.0 and ISO/IEC 27001 controls helps shorten that window, because it produces a log that shows which releases were verified. Our earlier piece on state-linked attacks on critical infrastructure reached a similar conclusion about stolen credentials.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the Revolut data breach?

Attackers used a compromised Italian government certified email account to send fraudulent requests for customer information to Revolut's Lithuanian bank over several months. Revolut treated them as genuine legal requests and disclosed identity documents, selfies, and transaction histories. Revolut confirmed the impersonation scam on September 12, 2026 and said its systems and customer funds were unaffected.

How many Revolut customers were affected?

Revolut has said only that a limited number of customers were affected and that it contacted them directly. The attackers told the Financial Times they targeted about 680 customers they believed held large cryptocurrency balances, mostly in Switzerland and France. That figure comes from the attackers and has not been confirmed by Revolut.

What is a fraudulent emergency data request?

A fraudulent emergency data request is a forged demand for customer records that appears to come from police or another government authority, usually sent from a stolen government email account. The FBI warned in November 2024 that criminals were using these requests to obtain personal information from companies that are legally obliged to cooperate with genuine investigations.

How can a bank verify a law enforcement data request?

Verify the requester through a channel the sender does not control, such as a published agency phone number, and confirm the named officer and case exist. Check that the cited law matches the requesting authority's jurisdiction, release only the fields that law requires, and give a security leader ownership of the intake process alongside legal and compliance.

How RED SKY helps

The Revolut case is a governance failure before it is a technical one, and closing it takes a security leader with authority over processes that legal and compliance own today. RED SKY Consulting provides that through fractional CISO advisory for financial services teams, drawing on an 8,500-plus CISO advisory network and 35+ Fortune 100 CISO and CIO references.

Every bank has a front door that security watches and a side door that legal answers. The Revolut attackers used the side door. Someone at the executive level has to own both.

Séan Donovan, Founder and CEO, RED SKY Consulting

Where the fix needs delivery capacity, our GRC program alignment and readiness support under a statement of work maps request handling to NIST CSF and ISO/IEC 27001. Advisors are selected through the Triton vetting process, and our financial services security practice page covers the wider sector. Talk to RED SKY about fractional security leadership.


Sources

  1. Revolut confirms customer data breach through fake government requests, TechCrunch, 2026.
  2. Personal, Financial Info Exposed in Revolut Data Breach, SecurityWeek, 2026.
  3. Revolut Data Breach: 5 Months, 680 High-Profile Accounts, $3M Ransom, SecurityWeek, 2026.
  4. Hackers say they breached Italian state email to target Revolut crypto whales, The Irish Times, 2026.
  5. Revolut Data Leak May Trace Back to Compromised Italian Government Accounts, Security Affairs, 2026.
  6. Revolut's breach began with a stolen government password, American Banker, 2026.
  7. Revolut Hackers Used Infostealers for Elaborate Social Engineering, Hudson Rock (InfoStealers), 2026.
  8. Easy Access to Information for Conducting Fraudulent Emergency Data Requests Impacts US-Based Companies and Law Enforcement Agencies, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2024.
  9. 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report Executive Summary, Verizon, 2025.
  10. 2025 Cost of a Data Breach Report, IBM, 2025.
  11. Article 33 GDPR: Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority, GDPR text, 2016.

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